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WHY LENITY IS A NECESSARY, YET UNWORKABLE
SOLUTION IN INTERPRETING THE COMPUTER
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
INTRODUCTION
In a mere handful of decades, computers have facilitated
unprecedented access to digital information. As this swell of
available data increasingly includes the most sensitive personal
information, regulation is needed to shield the public from the
opportunistic machinations of bad actors. The Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act (CFAA),1 was Congress’s response to criminal
activity via computer, criminalizing the illicit access of digital
information. As with many pieces of new legislation, the CFAA
ushered in a melee of judicial interpretation. In a range of cases
tackling the nuances of the CFAA, even the tamest of phrases
were subject to varying judicial interpretations, leading to
strikingly different results. When such conflicting results
concern something as central to contemporary life as computers,
it represents potentially nationwide repercussions.
In a two-to-one decision in United States v. Valle, the
Second Circuit determined the meaning of “exceeds authorized
access” as defined in the CFAA to be ambiguous, and therefore,
after applying the rule of lenity, adopted the narrow
interpretation that the phrase only applies to users who access
information outside of the scope of their authorization.2 This was
chosen over the broader view, which would extend the meaning
of the phrase to users who access otherwise authorized information
for an improper use.3 Arguably, however, both interpretations are
problematic. Under the narrow view’s adoption of lenity—
excluding an improper, but otherwise authorized access from the
“exceeds authorized access” analysis4—arguably any use that
1 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a) (2012).
2 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 523–28 (2d Cir. 2015).
3 Id. at 523–28; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
4 See Valle, 807 F.3d at 527–28 (Second Circuit applying lenity and
reversing the district court’s verdict that Valle had exceeded his authorized access by
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“exceeds authorized access” in essence becomes “unauthorized.”
This therefore renders the “exceeds” language redundant,
thereby leaving a blind spot in the CFAA regarding fraudulent
access to information by otherwise authorized users. In
contrast, under the broader view, the CFAA would essentially
criminalize any violation of a computer use policy—even
restrictions imposed by terms of service that users do not know
about.5 In deciding Valle, the Second Circuit joined the Fourth
and Ninth Circuits in a canyon-like circuit split against the
First, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits which hold the
broader view that violations of usage restrictions are within the
scope of “exceeds authorized access.”6 As the resolution of this split
could affect all the nation’s computer usage, should we favor more
narrow protections at the expense of enforceability, or broader
protections that could result in a tidal wave of accidental liability?
Valle represents perhaps the most colorful fact pattern
out of the cadre of cases in the split. The defendant in Valle,
nicknamed “cannibal cop,” was a New York Police Department
officer who used credentialed access to a government database
in order to obtain information about the subjects of his
cannibalistic sexual fantasies.7 He was tried and convicted by a
jury for conspiracy to kidnap and for violation of the CFAA by
exceeding his authorized access to the databases from which he
obtained the information.8 The district court reversed the
conspiracy verdict, but affirmed the charge under the CFAA.9
On appeal, a two-to-one majority reversed Valle’s conviction
under the CFAA, holding that the ambiguous language of the
statue, and the credibility of both interpretations, required the
invocation of the rule of lenity and the statute therefore had to be
narrowly tailored in the defendant’s favor.10 Under this narrow
improperly using the database he was otherwise authorized to use, therefore
eliminating an improper use analysis).
5 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858, 860–62 (9th Cir. 2012).
6 For the cases in the split adopting the narrow interpretation, see Valle, 807
F.3d 508; Nosal, 676 F.3d 854; and WEC Carolina Energy Sols., LLC. v. Miller, 687
F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2012). For the cases in the split adopting the broad interpretation,
see United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. John, 597
F.3d 263, (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010);
Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006); and EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, 274 F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001).
7 See Benjamin Weiser, Prosecutor in “Cannibal Cop” Case Asks Appeals Court
to Reinstate Conviction, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2vx1GVO [http://
perma.cc/E5M6-DSXX]; see also Joseph Goldstein, Officer Plotted to Abduct, Cook and
Eat Women, Authorities Say, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25 2012), https://nyti.ms/2vx9cjC
[http://perma.cc/7WMP-K2N8] (describing the facts that led to Valle’s arrest).
8 Valle, 807 F.3d at 512–13.
9 Id. at 513, 515 (citing United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 111, 113
(S.D.N.Y. 2014)).
10 Id. at 523–28.
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interpretation, since Valle possessed the technical credentials to
access the information, the CFAA was inapplicable.11 An
impassioned dissent argued that the text of the CFAA was
unambiguous, therefore the rule of lenity was irrelevant, and that
Valle’s conviction under the CFAA should not have been reversed.12
This note first argues that the Second Circuit was
correct in applying lenity to the phrase “exceeds authorized
access”13 due to the logical validity of both the narrow and
broad interpretations. Second, this note argues that under the
narrow view’s application of lenity, all use that “exceeds
authorized access” essentially becomes “unauthorized,” rendering
the language superfluous. In contrast, under the broad
interpretation, Section (a)(2) opens the door to arbitrary and
draconian enforcement. Therefore, the prudent solution to
suture the split would be for the legislature to remove liability
for a use that “exceeds authorized access” under Section (a)(2) in
the event the conduct would only receive the minimum
punishment under (c)(2)(A).14 As this would resolve the narrow
view’s concern over the potential for arbitrary absurdity, it
could then release the improper use analysis from the jaws of
lenity, thereby restoring uniformity to the interpretation of the
“exceeds” prong.
Part I of this note gives a primer on the birth and
evolution of the CFAA in reference to the “exceeds” prong. Part
II then details the diverging interpretations of the phrase
within the circuits of the split. Narrowing the focus to United
States v. Valle, Part III discusses the facts of the case, as well
as the majority and dissenting opinions. Picking a side, Part IV
argues that the Second Circuit was correct in applying lenity in
Valle due to the inherent ambiguity of the exceeds prong.
Finally, Part V contends that in order for Congress to conjure a
workable solution to reconcile the fifteen-year-old split, liability
should be omitted as a use that “exceeds authorized access”
under Section (a)(2) until the conduct reaches the threshold for
the second tier of punishment under Section (c)(2)(B). This
alteration would remove the section’s vast potential for
arbitrary and possibly unjust enforcement, thereby allowing for
11 Id.
12 Id. at 537–40 (Straub, J., dissenting).
13 As defined in the CFAA, “the term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.” 18
U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
14 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (Under this minimum tier of punishment for section
(a)(2), simply the act of accessing a computer in excess of one’s authorized access will
trigger liability, subjecting the offender to one year in jail, a fine, or both.).
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the broad view’s improper use analysis under the exceeds
prong throughout the rest of the statute.
I. THE INCEPTION AND EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER
FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT
The CFAA came to be as a response to computer crime,
and has been continuously reshaped and reconsidered as
computers have evolved from a novel invention to a necessary
tool used for navigating the modern world. This part examines
the Act from “crib” to present, and how it has continuously
been molded by ever-changing policy concerns, as well as the
need for the government to wield some form of policing power
over the unruly and amorphous connectivity of information in
the digital world.
A. History of the Act
Congress has continuously broadened the scope and
coverage of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act since its original
enactment. Reflecting on the history of the Act’s expansion, the
Senate Report on the 1996 amendments noted:
As intended when the law was originally enacted, the Computer
Fraud and Abuse statute facilitates addressing in a single statute
the problem of computer crime . . . . As computers continue to
proliferate in businesses and homes, and new forms of computer crimes
emerge, Congress must remain vigilant to ensure that the Computer
Fraud and Abuse statute is up–to–date and provides law enforcement
with the necessary legal framework to fight computer crime.15
In response to the increasing rate of computer crime, Congress
enacted the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act, entitling 18 U.S.C. § 1030 “Fraud and related
activity in connection with computers.”16 The act originally
only protected a narrow category of government computers, or
those used in financial institutions, criminalizing “computer
misuse to obtain national security secrets, computer misuse to
15 Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application
of Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1030), 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (2001)
(omission in original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 5 (1996)).
16 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2012)); see H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 2 (1984); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 16 (1986).
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obtain personal financial records, and hacking into U.S.
government computers.”17
Access and authorization were defined as: “knowingly
accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed
a computer with authorization, uses the opportunity such access
provides for purposes to which such authorization does not
extend.”18 The conduct was analogized to “breaking and entering,”
with Congress stating the act “deals with an ‘unauthorized access’
concept of computer fraud rather than the mere use of a
computer.”19 However, “[t]he 1984 Act had a couple of loopholes,
or scenarios not accounted for: 1) authorized persons causing harm
to protected computer systems; and 2) unauthorized persons who
gave codes or software to authorized persons who loaded them into
their computers.”20 Essentially foreshadowing the current split,
these loopholes could have been exploited by users who abused
otherwise authorized access for nefarious purposes.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act to amend the 1984 version.21 Congress amended the
“knowingly” requirement to “intentionally” in order to prevent an
accidental violation by someone “who inadvertently ‘stumble[s]
into’ someone else’s computer file or computer data.”22
Additionally, the reach of the statute was extended to private
computers under the addition of the new category “Federal
Interest Computer,” expanding on the original requirement that
the subject computer must have been used by a financial
institution or the U.S. Government to include, “one of two or
more computers used in committing the offense, not all of
which are located in the same State.”23 The proscribed conduct
was still analogized to thievery via computer.24 Therefore, two
fundamental differences between the original and the 1986
amendment were a stricter scienter25 requirement coupled with
17 Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1563–64 (2010); see Counterfeit Access Device and Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984 § 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190–92.
18 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984
§ 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 1290–91. This is the primordial form of the exceeds prong.
19 H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20.
20 Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1194 (E.D.
Wash. 2003) (emphasis added) (citing Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act of 1984, § 2012(a), 98 Stat. at 2190).
21 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat. 1213.
22 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6 (emphasis added).
23 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, § 2, 100 Stat. at 1213–15.
24 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9.
25 “A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done
knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment.” Scienter,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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a substantial expansion to the category of computer covered by
the CFAA.
Most significantly, the 1986 Act included the current
language of “exceeds authorized access,” reading: “the term
‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled so
to obtain or alter.”26 In Congress’s own words, the exceeds
language was used to replace its previous form to remove “one of
the murkier grounds of liability, under which a Federal
employee’s access to computerized data might be legitimate in
some circumstances, but criminal in other (not clearly
distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to exceed
[their] authorization.”27 This represents an acknowledgement of
ambiguity as to when an authorized, yet illegitimate, use would
be considered a crime in the then-fledgling statute.
The CFAA was again amended in 1994 as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,
under the smaller subsection titled the Computer Abuse
Amendments Act of 1994.28 Most notably, the amendments
extended the scope of the previously criminal-only CFAA to
allow for a private cause of action.29 This not only represented
another large expansion of the CFAA but also opened the door
for an onslaught of private litigation.
The CFAA was amended yet again by the Economic
Espionage Act of 1996, under the subsection the National
Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996.30 These
amendments represent one of the largest expansions to the
CFAA, criminalizing any type of unauthorized (or in excess of
authorization) access to information on a computer “if the
conduct involved an interstate or foreign communication.”31
These amendments were coupled with a drastic expansion to the
definition of computers under the protection of the CFAA,
replacing “Federal interest” computer with “protected” computer,
covering any computer “which is used in interstate or foreign
commerce or communication.”32 This eliminated the previous
26 § 2, 100 Stat. at 1213–15; accord 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
27 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 21 (emphasis added).
28 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, § 290001, 108 Stat. 1796, 2097–99.
29 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012).
30 Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 201, 110 Stat.
3488, 3491–94.
31 Id. at 3492.
32 Id. at 3493.
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requirement that the offense be committed on two or more
computers in different states.33
The Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act of
2008, as found within the Former Vice President Act of 2008,34
brought the CFAA to its current form and showcased yet
another hefty expansion—although one would need a
magnifying glass to see the change in language.35 The act
removed the requirement that the illegal access of a “protected
computer” include some form of an interstate communication
under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2), thereby allowing for purely
intrastate liability.36 Secondly, the definition of “protected
computer” was subtlety expanded to include computers “used
in . . . [or] affect[ing] interstate or foreign . . . communication.”37
In layman’s terms, the statute would now include basically any
computer with Internet access regardless of whether it was
actually used in interstate communication due to the total lack
of borders in digital communication.38
The CFAA has evolved from a statute prohibiting the
unauthorized access of information from a government computer,
to criminalizing, as well as providing a private cause of action for,
the access of information from any computer with Internet access,
that is unauthorized, or in excess of authorization.
B. The Current CFAA
As noted above, the CFAA has continuously expanded
the group of computers that fall under its protection, with the
current definitions being the most expansive to date.39 The
current CFAA defines a computer as “an electronic, magnetic,
optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing
device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and
includes any data storage facility or communications facility
directly related to or operating in conjunction with such
device.”40 This definition has includes cellular telephones,41 as
well as computer-based radio systems.42 It does, however,
33 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat.
1213, 1215.
34 Former Vice President Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, §§ 203-09, 122
Stat. 3560, 3560–65 (2008).
35 See Kerr, supra note 17, at 1569–70.
36 § 203, 122 Stat. at 3561.
37 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B) (2012); see § 207, 122 Stat. at 3563 (emphasis added).
38 See discussion infra Section I.B.2.
39 See discussion supra Section I.A.
40 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
41 See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900 (8th Cir. 2011).
42 See United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 2005).
1856 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:4
expressly exclude “automated typewriter[s] . . . portable hand
held calculator[s], or [any] other similar device[s].”43
The CFAA defines a protected computer as either one
used by a “financial institution or the United States
Government” or, by drawing on the full power vested to
Congress through the Commerce Clause of the Constitution,44
one “which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce
or communication, including a computer located outside the
United States that is used in a manner that affects interstate or
foreign commerce or communication of the United States.”45 Under
this second definition, a protected computer becomes any computer
(as defined under the CFAA) with access to the Internet.46
Now that the term “computer” has been explained in the
context of the CFAA, how does one access it in excess of
authority? As defined in the text of the CFAA—and as noted in
this note’s introduction—“the term ‘exceeds authorized access’
means to access a computer with authorization and to use such
access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the
accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter.”47 In the sections of
the CFAA enumerating criminal conduct, “exceeds authorized
access,” is always found directly following the term “without
authorization.”48 For the purposes of the analysis to follow, the
first half of this clause will be referred to as the “unauthorized
prong,” and the other as the “exceeds prong.” “Unauthorized” is
not a defined term in the CFAA, but the term “authorization”
has consistently been given its plain, everyday meaning when
interpreting the unauthorized prong.49 It is important to note
that the exceeds prong only applies to certain offenses under the
statute, with several provisions only applying exclusively to users
with a total lack of authorization.50 Congress’s motive behind this
43 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
44 “The Congress shall have Power To . . . regulate commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
45 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2).
46 See United States. v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012); United States. v.
Yücel, 97 F. Supp. 3d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). This could possibly also include smartwatches,
modern cars, modern videogame systems, cable boxes, etc.
47 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6).
48 Id. § 1030 (a)(1) (“without authorization or exceeding authorized access”);
id. (a)(2) (“without authorization or exceeds authorized access”); id. (a)(4) (“without
authorization, or exceeds authorized access”), id. (a)(7)(B) (“without authorization or by
exceeding authorized access”).
49 See United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d 504, 511 (2d Cir. 1991). The plain,
everyday meaning of authorize is defined as to “approve, consent to[,] . . . permit, allow,
license, entitle, [or] empower.” Authorize, THE OXFORD DESK DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS 47 (Frank R. Abate ed., American ed. 1997).
50 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3), (5)(A).
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was to differentiate “insiders, who are authorized to access a
computer,” and “outside hackers who break into a computer.”51
The exceeds prong appears in Sections (a)(1), (2), (4),
and (7)(B).52 Section (a)(1) prohibits the access of confidential
government information.53 Section (a)(2) prohibits the access of
information on, among other things, a protected computer.54
Section (a)(4) prohibits the access of a protected computer in
furtherance of a fraud, resulting in the obtainment of anything
under $5000.55 Section (a)(7)(B) prohibits extortion involving a
threat to a protected computer.56 Sections (a)(1), (4), and (7)(B)
all require that the offender specifically access the information
in conjunction with a malicious purpose,57 while in (a)(2), the
mere intent to access is enough to trigger liability.58 Simply
put, every instance of “exceeds authorized access,” aside from
(a)(2), is contained in a section enumerating a specific offense—
i.e., theft of national secrets, fraud, or extortion—whereas
(a)(2) only involves the access of a computer.59 Looking
specifically at Section (a)(2) of the statute, the CFAA attaches
liability to:
(a) Whoever—
. . . .
(2) intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or
exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains—
(A) information contained in a financial record of a financial
institution, or of a card issuer as defined in section 1602(n) of title
15, or contained in a file of a consumer reporting agency on a
consumer, as such terms are defined in the Fair Credit Reporting
Act;
51 S. REP. NO. 104–357, at 11 (1996); see also S. REP. NO. 99–432, at 7 (1986)
(discussing choice not to use exceeds prong in certain violation, stating “[a]t the same
time, the Committee was required to balance its concern for Federal employees and other
authorized users against the legitimate need to protect Government computers against
abuse by ‘outsiders.’”).
52 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4), (7)(B) (These sections detail the conduct
criminalized by the CFAA.). The phrase also appears in Sections (e)(6) and (e)(10).
Id. § 1030(e)(6), (10) (These sections detail the definition of the phrase, as well as the
statute’s definition of conviction.).
53 Id. § 1030(a)(1).
54 Id. § 1030(a)(2).
55 Id. § 1030(a)(4).
56 Id. § 1030(a)(7).
57 Id. § 1030(a)(1) (intentional procurement of confidential government
information); id. § 1030(a)(4) (in furtherance of intended fraud, assisting in the obtainment
of an object of over $5000 in value); id. § 1030(a)(7)(B) (intent to commit extortion).
58 Id. § 1030(a)(2) (mere intent to access in order to obtain information).
59 Id. § 1030(a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(7); compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2).
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(B) information from any department or agency of the United
States; or
(C) information from any protected computer.60
After a violation of the CFAA, what kind of
punishments can be expected? Under the current form of the
CFAA, violations of Section (a)(2) are subject to a three-tiered
sentencing system.61 The lowest tiered offense, yet the most
problematic in the eyes of those crying lenity, is Section
(c)(2)(A), which calls for a fine, a year in prison, or both, for a
violation or attempted violation of Section (a)(2).62 Second in
the batting order, and in this author’s opinion, the most logical
approach to liability due to the requirement of motive or
minimum value to the information obtained, is Section
(c)(2)(B), which calls for a fine, five years in prison, or both, for
a completed or attempted violation of Section (a)(2), if
“committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private
financial gain[,] . . . committed in furtherance of any criminal
or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States or of any State,” or “the value of the information
obtained exceeds $5,000.”63 Finally, under Section (c)(2)(C), one
who commits, or attempts to commit a violation of Section
(a)(2) after a previous conviction under (c)(2)(A) or (B), will face
a fine, ten years in prison, or both.64
As Section (a)(2) and its lowest tier of punishment only
require the intent to “access[ ] a computer without
authorization or [in excess of] authorized access,” instead of
requiring a malicious purpose, or even an intent to obtain
information, it could therefore be viewed as a type of quasi-
strict liability.65 The word “quasi” is used as there is still the
hurdle of intending to access the computer, therefore precluding
cases of purely accidental access (which in this author’s opinion,
could push the section into strict liability territory). This type of
quasi-strict liability, when paired with the immensely broad
60 Id. § 1030(a)(2) (internal citation omitted).
61 Id. § 1030(c)(2).
62 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A). Also included are violations of Sections (a)(3) and (6).
Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
63 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B).
64 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(C). Again, violations of Sections (a)(3) and (6) are also
included. Id. at § 1030(c)(2)(C).
65 Id. § 1030(a)(2), (c)(2)(A). Black’s Law Dictionary defines strict liability as
“[l]iability that does not depend on proof of negligence or intent to do harm but that is
based instead on a duty to compensate the harms proximately caused by the activity or
behavior subject to the liability rule.” Strict Liability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014). For a hypothetical example of this alleged quasi-strict liability, see infra Part II.
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definition of “protected computer,” appears to be the lynchpin in
several circuits’ application of lenity to the statute.66
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT SCORECARD: THENARROW, THE BROAD,
AND THEUGLY
Steve Strawman, an engineer at Hypothetical Inc., lives
in a jurisdiction that follows the narrow view of the exceeds
prong. Steve, using his unique password and username to
access the company server (to be used for work purposes only),
accesses and downloads client contact information to sell to
Hypothetical Inc.’s main competitor. As Steve had access to the
company server, his improper use would not exceed his
authorized access under the narrow view. Steve would only have
exceeded his authorized access under the narrow view if some
form of internal circumvention was required to access the client
list to which his current credentials did not pass muster.67
On the other hand, say Steve Strawman instead lives in
a jurisdiction that follows the broad view. This time he accesses
and downloads the client list merely to send out invitations to a
dinner party. As per his employee agreement, however, Steve
was only allowed to access this list in the course of his
professional duties. As this action was in clear violation of the
usage restrictions set by Hypothetical Inc., Steve has exceeded
his authorized access under the broad view’s interpretation of
the exceeds prong. He would therefore be in violation of the
CFAA.68 These two hypotheticals showcase the key difference
between the competing interpretations of the circuit split.
A. The Narrow View—Internal Virtual Trespass
The Fourth and Ninth Circuits have embraced the
narrow view of the exceeds prong, requiring the potential
offender to circumvent a system and access material he is
generally not cleared to view in order to violate the CFAA. In the
familiar case of an ex-employee utilizing proprietary information,
the Fourth Circuit veered toward the narrow view inWEC Energy
Solutions LLC v. Miller.69 The defendant downloaded and emailed
to himself proprietary information from databases, to which he
had authorized access, in order to make a presentation on behalf
of a competitor, in clear violation of the plaintiff ’s prohibition on
66 See discussion infra Section I.B.3.
67 See discussion infra Section II.A.
68 See discussion infra Section II.B.
69 WEC Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 201 (4th Cir. 2012).
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such usage.70 The defendant was alleged to have, among other
things, exceeded his authorized access to a protected computer
under Section (a)(2)(C) of the CFAA.71
In its opinion, the court acknowledged that “two schools
of thought exist,” (referencing the narrow and broad view) and
chose to apply lenity even though it was civil case.72 The court
noted that because the CFAA involves “both civil and criminal
application,” their reasoning would have to “appl[y] uniformly
in both contexts,” therefore recognizing that in a criminal
context, the exceeds prong was ambiguous enough to mandate
lenity.73 Therefore, under the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation, a
violation of usage restrictions would fail to trigger the exceeds
authorized access prong under the CFAA, instead a violation
would only occur “when [one] has approval to access a
computer, but uses [their] access to obtain or alter information
that falls outside the bounds of [their] approved access.”74 The
defendant therefore had no liability under the CFAA for his
improper use, as the court noted, to the “disappoint[ment] [of]
employers hoping for a means to rein in rogue employees.”75
In yet another case of employers attempting to use the
CFAA as a weapon against a former employee’s access of
proprietary information through credentialed access for an
improper use, the Ninth Circuit determined Section (a)(2) to
not be the appropriate vehicle for relief.76 Among other things,
the plaintiff ’s complaint alleged the defendant’s violation of
Section (a)(2) of the CFAA.77 The plaintiff, an addiction
treatment center, hired the defendant (who owned several
companies performing referrals for businesses similar to
plaintiff ’s) to help oversee certain operations, one of which
included interacting with a third party who provided computer
services to plaintiff.78 In the course of his duties, the defendant
received administrative access to plaintiff ’s website.79 During
his employment, the defendant emailed documents from the
plaintiff ’s website to his own and his wife’s personal email
accounts, and allegedly accessed plaintiff ’s information remotely
70 Id. at 202.
71 Id. at 203.
72 Id. at 203–04.
73 Id. at 204.
74 Id. at 204–06. The court also rejected the “cessation-of-agency theory” that
a breach of the duty of loyalty automatically made usage unauthorized. Id. at 206.
75 Id. at 207.
76 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127, 1128–29 (9th Cir. 2009).
77 Id. at 1131.
78 Id. at 1129.
79 Id.
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after he had ceased plaintiff ’s employ.80 While plaintiff
unsuccessfully pursued its claim under the unauthorized prong,
the Ninth Circuit determined that the claim would also fail
under the exceeds prong as the defendant was “entitled to
obtain the documents at issue.”81
Several years later the Ninth Circuit was afforded the
opportunity to officially adopt the narrow view in United States
v. Nosal.82 The defendant in Nosal, a former employee of the
plaintiff, persuaded his former colleagues to procure confidential
information from plaintiff, with the intention of using it to his
advantage as he planned to start a competing company.83 The
defendant was convicted for aiding and abetting the employees
in exceeding their authorized access under Section (a)(4) of the
CFAA (which also contains the exceeds prong), by convincing
them to access a protected computer to fraudulently procure
the valuable information.84 In a thoughtful opinion affirming
the dismissal of the defendant’s charge under the CFAA, the
court thought it dispositive that the broad interpretation would
turn the statute “into a sweeping Internet-policing mandate,”
creating liability for even the most microscopic digital misstep
on “all computers with Internet access.”85
While the court stated that the narrow interpretation is
the more valid of the two, in its conclusion it announced that it
was applying the rule of lenity, and therefore would construe
the statue narrowly in favor of the defendant.86 The dissent
urged that the plain meaning of the statute was clear, and that
the correct method of intervening upon the hypothetically vast
reach of the statute would be an as-applied constitutional
challenge.87 In a separate appeal, where Nosal tried to contest the
charges under the unauthorized prong, the Ninth Circuit chose to
use the plain meaning of the word in its analysis.88 Therefore,
80 Id. at 1129–30.
81 Id. at 1135 n.7.
82 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863–64 (9th Cir. 2012).
83 Id. at 856.
84 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2012); Nosal, 676 F.3d at 856.
85 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 858–59. To illuminate the sheer potential for liability,
the court used examples such as: the usage of “work computers for personal purposes,”
the former prohibition against minors using Google’s services, dating websites
forbidding the use of inaccurate information, posting items in the wrong category on
eBay or Craigslist, and finally noting that “website owners retain the right to changes
the terms [of service] at any time.” Id. at 858, 860–62.
86 Id. at 863–64.
87 Id. at 864–67 (Silverman, J., dissenting). “This is not an esoteric
concept. . . . A new car buyer may be entitled to take a vehicle around the block for a
test drive. But the buyer would . . . ‘exceed [their] authority’ . . . to take the vehicle to
Mexico on a drug run.” Id. at 865.
88 Nosal, 828 F.3d at 868.
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under the strictest application of the narrow view, an abuse of
authorized access is not enough to exceed one’s authority; instead
one must act as an inside hacker—an authorized user
circumventing an internal technological barrier.
B. The Broad View—Access Based on Usage Permissions
The First, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have
adopted the broad view of the exceeds prong. In the civil case of
EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., the First Circuit
endorsed the broad approach by affirming a preliminary
injunction against the defendant under the exceeds prong of 18
U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).89 Here, while the offense may have been
under Section (a)(4) as opposed to Section (a)(2), the
interpretation of the exceeds prong remained static. Defendant
Explorica and plaintiff EF Cultural Travel were both
competitors in the business of offering student tours, with
several of defendant’s employees having previously worked for
plaintiff.90 In an effort to undercut plaintiff, defendant developed
a computer program called a “scraper” to capture plaintiff ’s tour
prices from its website.91 To do this, the defendant used
proprietary knowledge about the structure of the plaintiff ’s site
and “tour codes whose significance [were] not readily
understandable to the public.”92 Tantamount to the First
Circuit’s finding that the use was in excess of authorization was
the overarching confidentiality agreement between plaintiff and
its former employees, including the strict prohibition on the
release of any information that would be adverse to plaintiff ’s
interests.93 This analysis appeared to be in large part based
upon contract law, holding that when defendant was in breach
of the confidentiality agreement, the use of proprietary
information in contradiction to plaintiff ’s interests exceeded the
defendant’s otherwise authorized access to the public website.94
In the companion case, also titled EF Cultural Travel
BV v. Explorica, Inc., the First Circuit faced the question of
whether the preliminary injunction against Explorica also
applied as to defendant Zefer Corp., the company responsible
for creating the “scraper” tool.95 The court rejected the district
89 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 585, 582 n.10 (1st
Cir. 2001).
90 Id. at 579.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 579, 583.
93 Id. at 583.
94 Id. at 582–84.
95 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 2003).
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court’s usage of a “reasonable expectations test” in determining
a lack of authorization under the CFAA.96 Interestingly, the
court acknowledged in dicta that a “lack of authorization may
be implicit, rather than explicit” in determining liability.97
The Seventh Circuit addressed the “paper thin”
difference between “‘without authorization’ and ‘exceeding
authorized access’” in International Airport Centers, L.L.C. v.
Citrin.98 While it was alleged the defendant had violated an
older version of the statute, which dealt with unauthorized
damage to a protected computer under Section (a)(5)(A),99 the
provisions are functionally identical to ones still currently in the
CFAA.100 The defendant in this case had been an employee of
plaintiff who “decided to quit . . . in breach of his employment
contract.”101 He then ran a program to delete all the files on his
work laptop, including data collected for plaintiff and evidence of
his improper conduct, and permanently prevent their recovery.102
Using agency theory, the court determined that the defendant
lost all authorization to use the laptop in question when he
breached a duty of loyalty to plaintiff.103 While the defendant’s
ultimate liability in this case was decided upon the use being
unauthorized, in their discussion of the difference between an
authorized use versus a use that exceeds authorized access, the
Seventh Circuit cited to a First Circuit case upholding the
broad view.104 The court’s decision therefore indicates that if
liability had hinged upon the exceeds prong, the Seventh
Circuit may have officially adopted the broad view.
In 2011, the Eighth Circuit implicitly adopted the broad
interpretation of the exceeds prong in United States v.
Teague.105 In affirming the district court’s opinion, the Eighth
Circuit held that the defendant had violated Section (a)(2)(B) of
the CFAA (obtaining “information from [any] department or
agency of the United States”) by exceeding her authorized access
96 Id. at 62–63. The test focused on what would be reasonably expected of an
ordinary user. Id. at 60.
97 Id. at 63.
98 Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006)
(quoting 18 U.S.C § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4) (2006)).
99 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A); Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C., 440 F.3d at 419.
100 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A), (B) (2012).
101 Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C., 440 F.3d at 419.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 420–21.
104 Id. at 420 (citing EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577,
583–84 (1st Cir. 2001); Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188,
1196–97 (E.D. Wash. 2003)).
105 United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1120 (8th Cir. 2011).
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when she violated her employer’s computer usage policy.106 The
violation in question occurred when the defendant—the
employee of a “contractor that assists with student loan
inquiries” for the Department of Education—accessed the
student loan information of former President Barack Obama to
satiate her curiosity.107 She was sentenced to two years of
probation for the offense.108 While there was no actual discussion
as to the scope of “exceeds authorized access” in the opinion,
the Eight Circuit’s decision to hold a violation of a usage policy
sufficient to satisfy the exceeds prong comports with the broad
view’s analysis.109
In United States v. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit
chose to establish a strict and broad approach in affirming the
defendant’s conviction of a twelve-month sentence under
Section 1030(c)(2)(A), for a violation of Section (a)(2)(B) of the
CFAA.110 The defendant, “a TeleService representative for the
Social Security Administration,” utilized credentialed access to
databases in order to acquire the sensitive personal information
of women with whom he was infatuated.111 In rejecting the
narrow interpretation, the court stated that as applied to the
facts of this case, “the plain language of the [CFAA] forecloses
any argument that [the defendant] did not exceed his authorized
access”; that is, by accessing the information for an improper
purpose, the defendant was no longer entitled to obtain the
information, and the conduct was clearly within the purview of
the exceeds prong.112 Finally, the court rejected the defendant’s
argument that he would only be liable had the violation
occurred in conjunction with a crime, tort, or for monetary gain
as it “would eviscerate the distinction between [the] misdemeanor
and felony provisions.”113 The United States Supreme Court
subsequently declined to hear the case on appeal.114 Therefore, to
summarize the broad view, if an individual violates a usage
restriction, that individual forfeits his or her entitlement to obtain
the information. As such, a use in violation of the usage restriction
represents a use that exceeds otherwise authorized access.
106 Id. at 1120–21.
107 Id. at 1121.
108 Id. at 1120.
109 Id. at 1120–22. In this author’s opinion, in viewing the similarities, yet
opposite outcomes, between this case and Valle, allows one to truly put their “finger on
the pulse” of the split.
110 United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258, 1260–62 (11th Cir. 2010).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1263.
113 Id. at 1264; see 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A) (2006); cf. id. § 1030 (c)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
114 Rodriguez v. United States, 563 U.S. 966 (2011).
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III. THE CANNIBAL COP COURT COURTS AMBIGUITY: THE
SECOND CIRCUIT ENTERS THE FRAY
In a case of dark fantasy and thought crime, Gilberto
Valle successfully reversed two jury convictions after two
rounds of appeals, and in doing so, prompted the Second
Circuit to join the narrow side of the split in the interpretation
of “exceeds authorized access.”115 The Court’s adoption of lenity,
and therefore the narrow interpretation of the statute, was
fueled by trepidation at the thought of the severe implications
the broad interpretation of the phrase would bring—the
possibility of making the entire country criminals for violations
of unread or unknown terms of service, thereby resulting in
arbitrary and absurd enforcement.116 In doing so, the Second
Circuit further illuminated an aged fissure in the judicial
interpretation of these three simple words in the CFAA, and
how perhaps in its current form it poses an irreconcilable clash
of logic—a logical reading giving illogical results.
A. Background and Procedural History
Prior to his jury conviction, Gilberto Valle was an NYPD
officer married to Kathleen Mangan, and had no prior criminal
record or history of violence.117 In his free time he frequented a
macabre sexual Internet group called “Dark Fetish Network”
where he would discuss kidnapping, torturing, and cannibalizing
women he knew with other individuals, including three users
charged as his co-conspirators.118
Due to his status as an NYPD officer, Valle was
permitted access to Omnixx Force Mobile, “a computer program
that allows officers to search various restricted databases,
including the federal National Crime Information Center
database, which contain sensitive information about individuals
such as home addresses and dates of birth.”119 Valle was well
115 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir. 2015).
116 Id. at 527. For example: an innocent and unknowing violation of a
website’s terms of services—which may be changed without notice—could be
considered a felony under the broad interpretation.
117 Id. at 512.
118 United States v. Valle, 301 F.R.D. 53, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part, 807 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2015). The three were “Michael VanHise, a man
from New Jersey who was known to Valle as ‘mikevanhise81@aol.com’ and
‘michael19902135@yahoo.com’; an un-identified individual apparently located in Pakistan
who used the screen name ‘Aly-Khan’; and Dale Bolinger, a man in England who was
known to Valle only by his screen name, ‘Moody Blues.’” United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d
508, 512 (2d Cir. 2015).
119 Valle, 807 F.3d at 512–13.
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aware that the NYPD had a strict policy restricting the
program’s use to only the course of his duties as an officer.120
Heedless of the known prohibition, in the period from 2011 to
2012, Valle accessed the database to query the names of
several women.121 All of the women were subjects of the sexual
fantasies discussed between himself and his alleged co-
conspirators.122 “There [was] no evidence, however, that Valle
used any information obtained from these searches in
furtherance of the alleged kidnapping conspiracy, or that he
told his alleged co-conspirators that he had conducted these
searches or had access to such information.”123
After his arrest, Valle was convicted by a jury for
conspiracy to kidnap,124 and for exceeding his authorized access
to the government database under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), to
which he subsequently moved for either a judgment of acquittal
or for a new trial.125 The district court granted Valle’s motion
with regard to the conspiracy to kidnap charge and reversed
the conviction, holding that the government had failed to
satisfy its burden of establishing “proof beyond a reasonable
doubt”126 that Valle’s actions truly crossed the threshold from
fantasy to conspiracy.127 The court did, however, affirm the
conviction under the CFAA as it found that Valle’s “conduct
[fell] squarely within the plain language of Section
1030(a)(2)(B).”128 As Valle was only permitted to use the
database in the course of his duties as an NYPD officer,129 the
court felt he had clearly exceeded his authorized access by
“access[ing the] computer with authorization and . . . us[ing]
such access to obtain . . . information . . . [he was] not entitled
so to obtain or alter.”130 The court acknowledged that the
Second Circuit had not yet weighed in on the reach of the
exceeds prong, as well as the differing methods of interpreting
120 Id. at 513.
121 Id. at 512–13; Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 76–77.
122 Valle, 807 F.3d at 512–13; Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 76–77.
123 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 77.
124 “If two or more persons conspire to violate [18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)—
kidnapping] and one or more of such persons do any overt act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.”
18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012).
125 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 59; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (motion for a judgment
of acquittal); id. R. 33 (motion for a new trial).
126 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 83.
127 Id. at 59, 60, 90.
128 Id. at 115.
129 Id.
130 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
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its scope in the other circuits, yet still held that such a blatant
disregard for usage restrictions triggered liability.131
B. The Majority Opinion and the Dissent
By a two-to-one majority opinion, the Second Circuit
affirmed the acquittal of the conspiracy to kidnap charge, yet
reversed the district court’s judgment on the CFAA charge.132
As the majority found merit in both the broad and narrow
interpretations of the phrase “exceeds authorized access,” they
therefore found that lenity,133 the judicial doctrine of construing
ambiguous criminal statutes narrowly in favor of defendants,
forced them to adopt the narrow view of the exceeds prong in
Valle’s favor.134 In reaching their ultimate conclusion, the court
looked to the legislative history of the exceeds prong,
considering first, the government’s contention that before the
“exceeds authorized access” prong was added to the CFAA in
1986, the statute contained an improper purpose analysis, and
that the current language was only meant to be a linguistic
simplification; and second, that Valle’s opposing contention
that the 1986 amendment was intended to “abrogate any
purpose-based inquiry”135 and therefore should only apply to
internal virtual trespass. Upon arrival at their decision to
apply lenity, and thus the move to adopt the more acute
interpretation of the exceeds prong, the majority admitted to
the logical validity of both arguments based on the legislative
history of the CFAA.136
In the court’s opinion, Valle was authorized to use the
database, so using it for an improper purpose did not fall under
the scope of the CFAA. In its analysis, the majority also
acknowledged the great divide of judicial interpretation in the
circuit split,137 stating that if the “sharp division means
anything, it is that the statute is readily susceptible to different
interpretations.”138 Additionally, the majority expressed a
shared trepidation with the Ninth Circuit that if the broad
view were adopted, it could possibly criminalize the conduct of
131 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 111–15.
132 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 528 (2d Cir. 2015).
133 For a more in-depth look at the inner workings of the doctrine of lenity, see
discussion infra Part IV.
134 Valle, 807 F.3d at 526.
135 Id. at 525–26.
136 See id. at 526.
137 Id. at 511.
138 Id. at 524.
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countless unsuspecting people for the violation of any
computer usage policy.139
The main thrust of the dissenting opinion in Valle was
that “[i]n reaching [the] result, the majority discover[ed]
ambiguity in the statutory language where there is none.
Under the plain language of the statute, Valle exceeded his
authorized access to a federal database in violation of the
CFAA.”140 Further contending that “[b]ecause the majority
opinion [sought] to enshrine all the conduct in this case in an
academic protective halo, [the dissent found] it necessary to
offer the realistic context of this controversy.”141 Acknowledging
and dismissing the majority’s policy concerns, the dissent
surmised that even if the current workings of the exceeds
prong were frighteningly broad, the legislature had the
exclusive power to remedy such a statute ripe for abuse, not
the judiciary.142 The dissent urged that as lenity is a “rule of
last resort,” the high threshold for its invocation had not been
reached in Valle, and its application was grossly inappropriate
where the proscribed conduct is unambiguous as applied to the
facts of this case.143 Finally, the dissent pushed back on the
majority’s consideration of the legislative history of the CFAA,
contending that even if the legislative history could possibly
support the narrow interpretation, that it is wholly irrelevant
when the statutory text is unambiguous on its face.144 The
striking polarity of the majority and dissenting opinions, while
not dispositive as to whether the narrow or broad view is
correct, is illustrative of how widely interpretation of the exceeds
prong varies—a fact that weighs in favor of the majority’s
finding of ambiguity.
IV. LEAN ON LENITYWHEN FACED WITH A LIEN ON LOGIC
The facts of Valle have served to further illuminate a
gorge of ambiguity in the CFAA, and regardless of whether
139 Id. at 527–28.
140 Id. at 537 (Straub, J., dissenting). In the dissent it was first argued that
the jury verdict as to the conspiracy to kidnap charge was based off of sufficient
evidence, and that it was not the court’s place to overturn it ad hoc. Id. at 529–37.
However, as this note is focused on the charge under the CFAA, the dissent’s reasoning
as to the sufficiency of evidence and the lines of “fantasy” and “reality” will be omitted.
141 Id. at 528–29.
142 Id. at 539 (citing Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)).
143 Valle, 807 F.3d at 539 (Straub, J., dissenting) (citing Oppedisano v. Holder,
769 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom., Oppedisano v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct.
211 (2015); United States v. Ron Pair Enters, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989)).
144 Id. at 540 (citing United States v. Woods, 134 S. Ct. 557, 567 (2013); Puello
v. Bureau of Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2007)).
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Valle’s perverse computer searches were a breach of his
employment contract, in this author’s opinion, lenity was the
only proper judicial tool to resolve this case of “thought crime.”
This section will discuss lenity and statutory interpretation as
it applies to the facts of Valle, arguing that the Second Circuit
was correct to invoke the rule and thus come down in Valle’s
favor in its legal analysis.
“The rule of lenity springs from the fair warning
requirement.”145 A fair warning challenge is defined as “[a]
defense that no one should be held criminally liable for conduct
that he or she could not reasonably understand to be
prohibited.”146 The rule of lenity mandates that upon a judicial
finding that a criminal statute is ambiguous, it must be
narrowly interpreted in a defendant’s favor.147 In upholding this
rule, the courts “interpret ambiguous criminal statutes in favor
of defendants, not prosecutors.”148
“In . . . circumstances . . . where text, structure, and
history fail to establish that the Government’s position is
unambiguously correct[,] [courts] apply the rule of lenity and
resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.”149 The
Supreme Court has “always reserved lenity for those situations
in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended
scope even after resort to ‘the language and structure,
legislative history, and motivating policies’ of the statute.”150
However, the mere possibility of a divergence of interpretation,
even “a division of judicial authority” is not in itself enough to
activate the rule.151
Therefore, to argue that this is more than a mere judicial
disagreement, and that the Second Circuit was in fact correct to
apply lenity to the exceeds prong, this section will argue that
even after reviewing the plain meaning of the words “exceeds
authorized access,” the wording as contained in the CFAA,
the legislative history, and chronology of the statute, as well
145 United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2000). Interestingly
enough, at least one court has held that the CFAA is not unconstitutionally vague.
United States v. Fernandez, No. 92 CR. 563 (RO), 1993 WL 88197, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
25, 1993).
146 Fair-Warning Challenge, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
147 Rule of Lenity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
148 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 519 (2008) (emphasis added).
149 United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (emphasis added).
150 Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 108 (1990) (emphasis added)
(quoting Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381, 387 (1980)).
151 Id. at 107–08. A fissure in judicial interpretation, even as large as the one
presented here, where more than half of the circuit court judges are aggressively
bifurcated in their analysis, is not sufficient in itself to trigger lenity. See discussion
supra Part II.
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as reviewing “access” as contained in other similar statutes,
both interpretations are plausible, and therefore the statute
is ambiguous.
A. Plain Meaning of the Words
To demystify the words “exceeds authorized access” as
some esoteric concept, one must examine the plain meaning of
the words. The approach will be as follows: first, the terms will
be examined using their dictionary definitions, and second, the
analysis used by the majority and dissent in Valle will be
scrutinized. The goal is to showcase that the phrase “exceeds
authorized access” on its face is easily susceptible to both a
narrow and broad interpretation.
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first
instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if
that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of
the law-making body which passed it, the sole function of the courts
is to enforce it according to its terms . . . .
Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise and the rules
which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion.152
“Our starting point for statutory interpretation is the
statute’s plain meaning, if it has one.”153 To discern the plain
meaning of the phrase “exceeds authorized access”—a phrase
so innocuous on its face, yet so capable of creating a tributary
of interpretations—the proceeding analysis will observe the
definitions in isolation, and then in conjunction with one
another.154 “Exceed” is defined as to “go beyond or do more than
is warranted . . . .”155 “Authorize” is defined as to “give
authority.”156 “Authorization” is defined as to “approve, consent
to[,] permit, . . . allow, license, entitle, [or] empower.”157
“Authority” is defined as a “delegated power.”158 Finally,
“access” is defined as “a right or opportunity to reach or use or
visit; admittance.”159 Thus when assembling the dictionary
definitions of the terms, “exceeds authorized access” will mean,
152 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (internal citations
omitted).
153 United States v. Dauray, 215 F.3d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 2000).
154 As each word has several definitions, only the definitions which are in this
author’s opinion on point to the discussion have been utilized in this note.
155 Exceed, supra note 49, at 263.
156 Authorize, supra note 49, at 47.
157 Authorization, supra note 49.
158 Authority, supra note 49, at 47.
159 Access, supra note 49, at 5.
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to “go beyond or do more than is warranted” the “delegated
power” of “a right . . . to reach[,] . . . use or visit.”160
Unfortunately, these terms linked as defined can be
seen to support either side of the circuits’ divide. For the
proponents of the broad interpretation, the pairing of the idea
that exceed can mean “more than is warranted,”161 with the
word “use” as contained in the definition of access,162 appears to
be directly on point with the interpretation that one can exceed
his authorized access by violating usage restrictions—i.e., a
nonwarranted use. Conversely, in support of the narrow
interpretation, is the idea that to exceed one’s authorized
access, one must “go beyond”163 his right to “reach” or “visit.”164
This notion agrees with the proposition that there must be
some form of internal trespass wherein the offender treads past
the boundaries of her “delegated power.”165 In the event of this
type of stalemate, lenity dictates the win go to the
interpretation favoring the defendant.166
In Valle the majority focused on how the term
“authorization” could be read in two ways, with each way
supporting either side of the argument.167 The majority also
reaffirmed that as an undefined term in the CFAA, the word
would be given its plain, everyday meaning.168 The court
reasoned that “authorization” could either support the
government’s contention that it refers to a specific mandate of
proper usage (the broad view), or that “it could . . . refer to the
particular files or databases in the computer to which one’s
authorization extends” (the narrow view).169 Delving deeper,
the court then rationalized that the true bone of contention
rested rather on how one interprets the term “access.”170 The
majority found that while not dispositive, when viewed in
conjunction with the phrase “without authorization,” the narrow
view was a sensible interpretation
because “without authorization” most naturally refers to a scenario
where a user lacks permission to access the computer at all, one
160 Id.; Authorize, supra note 49, at 47; Exceed, supra note 49, at 263.
161 Exceed, supra note 49, at 263.
162 Access, supra note 49, at 5.
163 Exceed, supra note 49, at 263.
164 Access, supra note 49, at 5.
165 Authority, supra note 49, at 47.
166 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 511, 513–14 (2008). In Santos,
the Supreme Court applied lenity when faced with the question whether “proceeds”
meant “receipts” or just “profits,” as both meanings held merit. Id. at 511, 513–14.
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sensible reading of the statute is that “exceeds authorized access” is
complementary, referring to a scenario where a user has permission
to access the computer but proceeds to “exceed” the parameters of
authorized access by entering an area of the computer to which his
authorization does not extend.171
Finally, by quoting the majority opinion in Nosal, the
Second Circuit agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis that as
read together, both the unauthorized prong and exceeds prong
could logically be read to apply only to hackers: “‘[w]ithout
authorization’ would apply to outside hackers (individuals who
have no authorized access to the computer at all) and ‘exceeds
authorized access’ would apply to inside hackers (individuals
whose initial access to a computer is authorized but who access
unauthorized information or files).”172 The majority did not
officially come down and pick a side of the fence at this stage of
the analysis.173
The dissent in Valle accused the majority of purposely
ignoring how unambiguous the exceeds prong is on its face due
to their policy concerns.174 According to the dissent, Valle was
well aware that he could only access the database for work
purposes, and by breaching that agreement had exceeded his
authorized access plain and simple.175 The core of the dissent’s
argument was that if the statute reads broadly as defined, then
it is broad, and therefore wholly the responsibility of the
legislature to fix.176 In this author’s opinion, while the majority
may have been partially swayed by policy concerns, the
dissent’s opinion on the plain meaning of the words is
dangerously black and white, in that it wholly fails to consider
whether the narrow view of the statute is plausible. Therefore,
the plain meaning of the words fails to name a clear victor.
However, this is merely the first step in the analysis, for
[w]hether a statutory term is unambiguous, . . . does not turn solely
on dictionary definitions of its component words. Rather, “[t]he
plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not
only] by reference to the language itself, [but as well by] the specific
context in which that language is used, and the broader context of
the statute as a whole.”177
171 Id.
172 Id. (quoting United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir.2012)).
173 Id. at 524–25.
174 Id. at 537–39 (Straub, J., dissenting).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081–82 (2015) (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)).
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B. “Exceeds Authorized Access” as Defined and Within the
Context of the Statue
In the effort to combat statutory ambiguity, context is key.
This crucial component in determining whether a statutory term
is ambiguous enough to invoke lenity,
“is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but also
by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole.” Identical language may
convey varying content when used in different statutes, sometimes
even in different provisions of the same statute.178
Therefore, an essential element in attempting to ferret out
ambiguity is to view the phrase “exceeds authorized access” as
defined in the CFAA, and the context with which it is placed
within the statute in its entirety.179
As defined, “‘exceeds authorized access’ means to access
a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain
or alter information in the computer that the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”180 Existing in a vacuum, the phrase
by itself does not shed light on whether some form of improper
circumvention is required, or if a mere misuse of granted access
will create liability. However, in the sections of the CFAA
detailing prohibited conduct, it is always in conjunction with and
immediately following “without authorization,”181 and therefore
must fall into a grey zone wherein the individual is not simply an
outsider cracking a virtual safe, but someone who was entrusted
access to a digital realm and abused said access in an unwarranted
manner. Yet this still does not ring dispositive to whether Valle
“exceeded his authorized access” by executing a handful of searches
outside of the scope of his duties, or if some form of further
unwarranted intrusion into the database was required.182
178 Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1077 (alterations in original) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341); see id. at 1078 (a protected fish was not a
“tangible object” under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as the statute due to the context and
purpose of the statute); cf. Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 126–27, 138–39
(1998) (having a gun within a car during a drug crime does constitute a valid use/carry
as it creates the potential for the harm the statute was designed to protect against).
179 See Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341; Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132
(1993). “In law as in life, however, the same words, placed in different contexts,
sometimes mean different things.” Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1082.
180 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
181 Id. § 1030(a)(2), (4).
182 For example: say one is given a key to a home with the express instructions
to not drink any of the vintage wines in the cellar. Would one need to simply drink the
wine, or would there need to be a lock on the cellar door to which the potential
committer of grand theft vino must pick?
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The exceeds prong is found within Sections (a)(1), (2),
(4), and (7)(B) of the statute criminalizing conduct.183 Section
(a)(1) deals with the intentional theft of confidential
government information.184 Section (a)(2) deals with the
unlawful procurement of data, either “contained in a financial
record of a financial institution, or of a card . . . , or contained in
a file of a consumer reporting agency on a consumer,”185 “from
any department or agency of the United States,”186 or “from any
protected computer.”187 Section (a)(4) criminalizes conduct when
a perpetrator “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a
protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized
access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended
fraud and obtains anything of value.”188 Finally, Section (a)(7)(B)
requires the wrongdoer have the intent to commit extortion,
through an interstate or foreign transmission, and threaten to
“obtain information from a protected computer.”189
Therefore, unlike the other sections, Section (a)(2) fails to
indicate criminal conduct with the specificity of the other
sections.190 Yet again, this breathes life into both interpretations
of the statute. The broad view could plausibly contend that due
to the specific and malicious behavior proscribed in the other
subsections of the CFAA containing the exceeds prong, that its
exclusion was intentional for Section (a)(2), as it was intended to
be a catch-all provision, otherwise many internal offenders (like
Valle), committing offenses the statute was arguably designed
to protect against, would get off scot free.191 Yet in a deft riposte
(using eerily similar logic), the proponents for the narrow view
could make the argument that as Section (a)(2)’s “sister-
sections” all expressly provide a clearly defined proscribed usage
subsequent to the appearance of “exceeds authorized access,”
then improper usage was not intended to be enshrined in the
exceeds prong, only the concept of digital trespass or internal
hackers. Additionally, it could be argued that if the legislature
sought to criminalize even accidental or innocuous violations,
183 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1), (2), (4), (7)(B).
184 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A).
185 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A).
186 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(B).
187 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C). Protected computer being the term that threatens to
give the CFAA its near omnipotent reach as it refers to a wide array of devices with
internet access. See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
188 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4).
189 Id. § 1030(a)(7)(B).
190 Id. § 1030(a)(2); cf. id. § 1030(a)(1), (4), (7)(B).
191 For example: it would be ludicrous for a government employee to escape
liability under § 1030(a)(1) for disseminating confidential government information
simply because she had been granted access. See id. § 1030(a)(1).
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then Congress would have been far more succinct in its
definition of the infamous three-word phrase.192 This deadlocked
split does not seem to give when looking at the defined term, or
its context in the CFAA as a whole. The logical next step would
be to attempt to read the tea leaves of legislative intent through
the CFAA’s history.
C. A Contradictory Legislative History
In examining any potential ammunition the legislative
history of the CFAA may provide to either side of the split, the
bulk of this cache will come from the Act’s original formation
and its 1986 amendment. In discovering an abundance of
artillery for either viewpoint, this section will urge that the
majority’s adoption of lenity in Valle was the correct choice, for
“[w]hen Congress leaves to the judiciary the task of imputing to
Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of lenity.”193
1. Support for the Narrow View
The CFAA was originally enacted to criminalize and
deter the growing crime of computer hacking, analogizing it to
trespass and thievery.194 This original scope is far more on point
with the narrow view’s internal hacker analysis as opposed to
the broad view’s contention that any contravention of usage
restrictions violates the exceeds prong. As trespass deals with
“wrongful entry,” its analogy to the CFAA recalls someone
treading where she does not belong, as opposed to someone
doing something improper in an area where she does.195 This is
also compounded with the legislature’s intention for Section
(a)(2) specifically to be about privacy protection.196 Privacy is
defined as “[t]he quality, state, or condition of being free from
public attention to intrusion into or interference with one’s acts
or decisions.”197 Viewing this definition in reference to Section
(a)(2), as well as the overarching theme of trespass in the CFAA,
it could imply that a violation thereof entails individuals going
192 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. 2012).
193 United States v. Santos, 533 U.S. 507, 515 (2008) (quoting Bell v. United
States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
194 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 2102(a), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190–92 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030 (2012));.H.R. REP. NO. 98-894, at 20 (1984); S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 9–10 (1986).
195 See Trespass, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
196 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6.
197 Privacy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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beyond the limits of their access in order to view something they
are not authorized to, not viewing something they are entitled to
in an impermissible way.198
The 1986 version of the Act altered the original wording
of the exceeds prong (“having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunity such access provides for
purposes to which such authorization does not extend”199) by
most notably removing the word “purposes.”200 This was
replaced with the current definition of “exceeds authorized
access” where a user with authorization uses that access “to
obtain or alter information in the computer the accesser is not
entitled so to obtain or alter.”201 This change was made in order
to resolve “one of the murkier grounds of liability,” to
distinguish a legitimate use from a criminal one.202 Is this
recognition of ambiguity, and an attempt to resolve the
internal trespass versus improper use divide? If so, the narrow
view would appear to emerge the winner. These changes,
viewed as an island, push toward the understanding that by
removing the word “purposes” and adding the word “entitled,”
that the analysis under the exceeds prong is intended to be
based off a spatial analysis as opposed to a behavioral one, e.g.,
an internal trespass as opposed to an improper use.
Finally, the 1986 amendment altered the scienter
requirement from “knowingly” to “intentionally.”203 This was
primarily done as in Congress’s opinion the word knowingly
might be inappropriate in the context of computers, as one
could “knowingly,” yet “inadvertently ‘stumble into’ someone
else’s computer file or computer data.”204 To elaborate on this
point, Congress also mentioned how one might exceed this
authorized access, giving the example: “where an individual is
authorized to sign onto and use a particular computer, but
subsequently exceeds his authorized access by mistakenly
entering another computer file or data that happens to be
accessible from the same terminal.”205 Two interesting things
might be gleaned from this example: (1) this was a use that
198 Of course, the possible pushback would be that if one abuses access to view
confidential information not as intended, then that could also be a violation of privacy.
The unique character of this inquiry as to the appropriateness of lenity however, is not
that there is one right answer, but that both answers could be right.
199 § 2102(a), 98 Stat. at 2190–92.
200 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–474, 100 Stat. 1213.
201 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2012).
202 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 21 (1986).
203 Id. at 5.
204 Id. at 6.
205 Id. (emphasis added).
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Congress did not want to criminalize;206 and (2) at the time
their idea of “exceeds” was, in fact, spatial.207 Under the given
example, the user, while authorized to use one computer,
exceeded that authorization when entering “another computer
file or data that happen[ed] to be accessible.”208 If Congress
meant in this example the user, while authorized to use one
computer, exceeds that authorization by accessing files on a
different computer or network, this type of usage would be
right on point with the theory of digital trespass.209
2. Support for the Broad View
A compelling argument for the broad view is that the
CFAA has shown continuous expansion since its inception.210
Throughout this rapid expansion, Congress has not once sought
to amend the “exceeds authorized access” language since it was
enshrined within the CFAA in 1986.211 The legislature has
chosen not to alter the language in order to clarify a very public
circuit split with a vintage of over fifteen years.212 One could
plausibly infer that Congress has deemed the statute to be
working as intended, and in accordance with the trend of the
CFAA’s reach growing exponentially bigger, that its intent was
for the exceeds prong to include the improper use analysis.
Additionally, and as the government argued in Valle, another
possible interpretation of Congress’s choice to remove the
“purposes” language from the original statute was not to alter
any culpability requirement, but merely to simplify the
wording of the statute.213
Fuel can be found for the broad view’s contention by
looking to the reasoning employed by Congress in deciding not
to include the exceeds prong in Section (a)(3) of the CFAA.214 It
206 If mistaken violations were intended to be left out of Section (a)(2), that
certainly does not support the broad view, which technically would criminalize such actions.
207 This is inferred from the usage of the phrase “entering another computer
file or data that happens to be accessible from the same terminal,” invoking the idea
that authorization refers to the right to use a computer and the data located therein, as
opposed to the terms of its use. S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 6.
208 Id.
209 Of course, the counter argument could be that this example was meant to
mean accessing files located on the same computer, which would indicate a violation of
use restrictions.
210 See Buckman, supra note 15.
211 See discussion supra Section I.A.
212 See discussion supra Part II.
213 S.REP.NO. 99-432, at 9; United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 525 (2d Cir. 2015).
214 Section (a)(3) deals with the access of government computers. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(3) (2012) The wording is still nearly identical to when it was originally
drafted. Compare id. § 1030(a)(3), with 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(3) (1986) (the original
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chose to omit the exceeds prong, finding it “not difficult to
envision an employee or other individual who, while authorized
to use a particular computer in one department, briefly exceeds
his authorized access and peruses data belonging to the
department that he is not supposed to look at.”215 Did Congress
imply that an employee with full access to multiple
departmental databases, but under the mandate of a usage
restriction, would exceed her authorized access by violating
that restriction? If so, is this a violation of a usage restriction,
or a trespass?
Finally for the broad interpretation, is language nestled
in a 1984 House Report,216 the year of the CFAA’s enactment.
The report discusses an example violation under Section (a)(3),
which contained the original form of the exceeds prong, stating
that “[t]he provision also would make it a criminal offense for
anyone who has been authorized to use a computer [and
accesses] it knowing that the access is for a purpose not
contemplated by the authorization.”217 Going further, the House
explained that
[t]he provision therefore does not extend to any type or form of
computer access that is for a legitimate business purpose. Thus, any
access for a legitimate purpose that is pursuant to an express or
implied authorization would not be affected. The provision does not
extend to normal and customary business procedures and information
usage and so these legitimate practices will not be interrupted or
otherwise affected.218
In other words, the exceeds prong would not extend to a
permissible use with regard to the scope of one’s employment.219
There was also discussion that an employee’s abuse of
authorization to commit “time stealing”—wasting time on a
computer at work—was not intended to be under the purview
of the exceeds prong, and the problem should be handled
administratively.220 This appears to provide support for the
broad view, as well as assuage anxiety from the narrow view.
The discussion of a legitimate business purpose is strikingly on
point with the improper purpose analysis toted by the broad
view. Yet by discussing the desire that minor infractions be
referring to any government computer, with the current version referring to nonpublic
government computers).
215 S. REP. NO. 99-432, at 7.
216 H.R. REP. NO 98-894, at 20‒23 (1984).
217 Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
218 Id. (emphasis added).
219 Id.
220 Id. at 21–22. This does seem to solve the problem of the narrow view’s
worry of criminalizing an employee checking social media at work.
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handled administratively, the narrow view’s worry of draconian
enforcement would seem to dissipate. To quote the Second Circuit
in Valle, “[a]t the end of the day, . . . [there is] support in the
legislative history for both [the narrow view’s] and the [broad
view’s] construction of the statute. But because [the] review
involves a criminal statute, some support is not enough.”221
D. Can Other Similar Statutes Tip the Scales of
Interpretation?
Can trends in the Congressional pen provide persuasion
as to whether the narrow or broad view should hold the crown?
Examining how Congress has tackled the complex topic of
digital access could either prove an invaluable source of
information, or be a fool’s errand in this final avenue of analysis.
1. Stored Communications Act: Access of Electronic
Communications
The Stored Communications Act (SCA) is a strikingly
similar statute to the CFAA. It “was enacted to ‘protect against
the unauthorized interception of electronic communications.’”222
The SCA makes it a criminal act whenever an individual
intentionally accesses without authorization a facility through which
an electronic communication service is provided; or . . . intentionally
exceeds an authorization to access that facility; and thereby obtains,
alters, or prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic
communication while it is in electronic storage in such system.223
Clearly, this is another statute with both an unauthorized and
exceeds prong, dealing with the obtainment or alteration of
information.224 Again in accord with the CFAA, the SCA doles
out harsher punishments of five years imprisonment, a fine, or
both, or ten years imprisonment, a fine, or both for a repeat
offense, if the action in question was done for “commercial
advantage,” “private financial gain,” or “in furtherance of any
criminal or tortious act.”225 Again similarly, there is a “catch-
all” that dictates one year imprisonment, a fine, or both if the
violation was not done in furtherance of the enumerated
221 United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 526 (2d Cir. 2015).
222 Organizacion Jd Ltda. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 124 F.3d 354, 359 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1 (1986)) (The SCA is part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act).
223 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
224 Compare id. § 2701(a) with id. § 1030(a)(2).
225 Compare id. § 2701(b)(1) with id. § 1030(c)(2)(B).
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intent.226 The SCA even directs its definition of “protected
computer” to the definition as contained in the CFAA.227
The term “exceeds an authorization” is not defined in
the SCA,228 yet some courts have chosen to understand the
phrase as it appears in the CFAA and the SCA analogous.229
Yet with so many similarities, one must look for the differences
to further this quest for certainty. A substantial difference
between the two manifests in the SCA’s definition of “computer
trespasser,” which is defined as:
a person who accesses a protected computer without authorization
and thus has no reasonable expectation of privacy in any
communication transmitted to, through, or from the protected
computer . . . [but] does not include a person known by the owner or
operator of the protected computer to have an existing contractual
relationship with the owner or operator of the protected computer for
access to all or part of the protected computer.230
If the SCA borrows the definition of “exceeds authorized access”
does that mean that the CFAA should borrow the definition of
“computer trespasser” from the SCA? Clearly the argument for
the narrow view would hammer this argument into the ground,
as the language obviously excludes those with some form of a
relationship entitling them access. While fuel for the opposing
side could possibly be that as this definition was not included
in the CFAA, the legislature did not intend for any “cross-talk”
between the statutes. An even stronger argument is that the
legislature purposely excluded this definition from the CFAA,
as their intent was for there to be an improper use analysis. It
would appear that for every one step forward, there are two
steps back in this exodus of understanding the exceeds prong.
226 Compare id. § 2701(b)(2) with id. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
227 See id. § 2711(1) (directing the reader to § 2510); id. § 2510(20) (directing
the reader to § 1030); id. § 1030(e)(2) (definition of protected computer).
228 See id. § 2711 (not defined therein); id. § 2510 (not defined therein).
229 See Cloudpath Networks, Inc. v. SecureW2 B.V., 157 F. Supp. 3d 961, 986–
87 (D. Colo. 2016); Cheng v. Romo, No. 11-10007-DJC, 2012 WL 6021369, at *3 (D.
Mass. Nov. 28, 2012); Penrose Computer Marketgroup, Inc. v. Camin, 682 F. Supp. 2d
202, 211 (N.D.N.Y. 2010); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-
Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 498 (D. Md. 2005).
230 18 U.S.C. § 2510(21)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
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2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Access and
Circumvention
While the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
does not cover uses that exceed authorized access,231 it is worth
exploring whether, as applied, the interpretation of access is
more in line with either side of the circuit split regarding the
exceeds prong of the CFAA. The DMCA proscribes the
“circumvent[ion of] a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under” the Copyright Act.232
Essential to finding a conviction under the DMCA, there must
have been a circumvention of an effective access control
resulting in an unauthorized access of the digital contents
therein.233 A circumvention “means to descramble a scrambled
work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise to avoid,
bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner.”234 An access
control is effective “if the measure, in the ordinary course of its
operation, requires the application of information, or a process
or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to
gain access to the work.”235 In other words, the access
protection is effective only if it can be ordinarily bypassed
through a device, such as a code, granted by the authority of
the copyright holder.236
It has been held that just because a defendant may have
an alternate “back door” to access the material is irrelevant,
what matters is how the access protection functions in its
ordinary operation.237 In Pearl Investments, LLC v. Standard
I/O, Inc., the defendant’s argument that it had programmed
the access restriction in question and kept a backup file that
allowed it continued access through a “tunnel,” was found to be
without merit.238 But in this case, summary judgment was
denied as to plaintiff ’s claim because it was unclear whether
231 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012) (no language similar to exceeds authorized
access appearing in the statute, instead dealing with circumvention of access
restrictions).
232 Id.
233 Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
234 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
235 Id. § 1201(a)(3)(B).
236 See id.
237 Pearl Invs., LLC v. Standard I/O, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 326, 350 (D. Me. 2003).
238 Id. at 349–50. Interestingly enough, there was also a civil charge under the
CFAA against defendant for a violation of Section (a)(5), but summary judgment was
granted for the defendant due to insufficient evidence of the mandatory $5000 damage
to the computer system. Id. at 348–49. As Section (a)(5) does not deal with the exceeds
prong, it is not discussed here.
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the defendant or the plaintiff ’s employees had constructed the
virtual “tunnel” that allowed access.239 Yet on the other side of
the coin, those with undisputed access, who use said access in
an authorized manner, are deemed to act as they please.240
Therefore in Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Skylink Technologies,
Inc., the defendant, a third party manufacturer of garage door
openers for the secondary market, had not violated the DMCA by
selling devices that interacted with the plaintiff’s copyrighted
garage door software, as the customers were authorized to access
the code in question to open their garage doors.241
It appears as if this interpretation of “access” under the
DMCA tilts more toward the narrow interpretation of the
exceeds prong under the CFAA, but both interpretations can
arguably fit. For the narrow view, as long as one is an
authorized user, absent any forced entry or illegal conduct, the
user is entitled free reign even outside of the intended scope as
provided.242 Reconciling this with the narrow view, there must
be some internal circumvention, as opposed to a use that falls
outside of restriction. To parry that argument, as access
restrictions under the DMCA are viewed as to the “ordinary
course of its operation,”243—one who abuses said access can still
be liable, thus attaching a similar meaning of access to the
CFAA would make it immaterial if one is fully authorized. Yet
again, arrival at the crossroads of interpretation appears
inevitable, and as ambiguity muddies the water, lenity’s
mandate becomes clear.
As the journey through the plain meaning of the words
“exceeds authorized access,” their context within the statute,
the legislative history of the statute, as well as other similar
statutes has failed to provide a beacon of clarity, it would
appear a victor emerges due to a lack thereof. For the foregoing
reasons discussed above, the Second Circuit was correct in
applying lenity, as lenity is a rule that “applies only if, ‘after
seizing everything from which aid can be derived,’ . . . [one] can
make ‘no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.’”244
239 Id. at 350.
240 See, e.g., Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178,
1204 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
241 Id. at 1183, 1204.
242 See id.
243 Pearl Invs., LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
244 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138–39 (1998) (quoting United
States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499 (1997)).
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V. HAS THE CURRENT INCARNATION OF SECTION (a)(2)
EXCEEDED ITSWELCOME?
Due to the inherent flaws in both the narrow and broad
interpretations of the exceeds prong, a prudent solution to the
split would be to limit liability to a use that “exceeds
authorized access” under Section (a)(2) only if it reaches a level
of conduct implicating the second tier of punishment under
Section (c)(2)(B). This alteration would eliminate ambiguity, as
well as the policy concerns of the CFAA becoming over-
expansive, thus de-shackling the phrase from the mandate of
lenity, and thereby allowing for the improper use analysis.
First, the “quasi-strict liability” of Section (a)(2)245 and the
massive reach of the “protected computer” analysis in Section
(a)(2)(C)246 pose grave potential for draconian punishment and
arbitrary enforcement, the driving force for the narrow view’s
adoption of lenity. Second, under the narrow view as many
believe to be required by lenity, all conduct that “exceeds
authorized access” is in fact “unauthorized,” and the phrase is
therefore superfluous.247 Finally, an ideal solution would be to
amend the first tier of punishment, (c)(2)(A), to remove Section
(a)(2) liability from under its purview. Thus, liability under
(a)(2) would only trigger once the act crosses the threshold into
eligibility for the second tier of punishment under Section
(c)(2)(B), therefore extinguishing the policy concerns of the
narrow view while allowing for the improper use analysis.
A. Exceeding the Limits of Logic: A Prosecutor’s Poison
Weapon
In a showcase of the CFAA’s potential for inordinate
punishment, take the case of Aaron Swartz, a computer
prodigy with a passion for freedom of information.248
245 Section (a)(2) merely requires to the intent to access and obtain
information outside the purview of authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012); see
discussion supra Section I.B.
246 See United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 858 (9th Cir. 2012).
247 The fact that this argument could be used to argue that Congress intended
the exceeds prong to be interpreted under the broad view is not lost upon this author,
however the goal of this section is to illustrate the flaws in both interpretations, not
argue that one side is correct and the other wrong.
248 See Anne Cai, Aaron Swartz Commits Suicide, THE TECH (Jan. 12,
2013), http://tech.mit.edu/V132/N61/swartz.html [https://perma.cc/5JDZ-XD8V]; Larissa
MacFarquhar, Requiem for a Dream: Aaron Swartz Was brilliant and Beloved. But the
People Who Knew Him Best Saw a Darker Side, NEW YORKER (Mar. 11, 2013), http://
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/03/11/requiem-for-a-dream [https://perma.cc/A4ME-
GYT9]; John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), https://nyti.ms/2jD79Y6 [http://perma.cc/HHT2-
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Unfortunately, his life was cut short after committing suicide
in his Brooklyn apartment on January 11, 2013, at the age of
twenty-six.249 He had been “indicted in July 2011 by a federal
grand jury for allegedly downloading millions of documents
from JSTOR through the MIT network—using a laptop hidden
in a basement network closet in MIT’s Building 16—with the
intent to distribute them.”250 He was facing a potential
maximum sentence of thirty-five years in prison and a one
million dollar fine.251 While this case may have been decided on
the unauthorized prong, it is a prime example of the troubling
potential for the CFAA to be used as the ultimate scare tactic
in a prosecutor’s arsenal—drumming up charges on
disproportionate transgressions to increase the pressure on
defendants to settle.252
United States v. Drew illustrates how a prosecutor
hungry for a conviction may attempt to stretch 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(2) when nothing else will stick.253 The defendant in
Drew set up a fake MySpace account254 in order to harass her
daughter’s thirteen-year-old classmate by pretending to be a
sixteen year old through a dummy profile.255 After fictitiously
flirting with her daughter’s classmate for several days, the
defendant-mother then messaged the classmate saying “the
world would be a better place without [the classmate] in it.”256
The classmate committed suicide that same day.257 The
TVWA]. Swartz’s impressive bragging rights included: the development of RSS software
at the mere age of 14, involvement in drafting the codes for Lawrence Lessig’s Creative
Commons, creating a company to merge with Reddit at 19, as well as co-founding
Demand Progress.
249 Cai, supra note 248; MacFarquhar, supra note 248.
250 Cai, supra note 248. “JSTOR is a shared digital library created in 1995 to
help university and college libraries free up space on their shelves, save costs, and
provide greater levels of access to more content than ever before.” New to JSTOR? Learn
More About Us, JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/10things [https://perma.cc/LGT8-2H5W].
251 Schwartz, supra note 248.
252 See Cindy Cohn, Aaron’s Law Reintroduced: CFAA Didn’t Fix Itself, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/04/aarons-law-
reintroduced-cfaa-didnt-fix-itself [https://perma.cc/7YKC-UTKJ].
253 The court in this case appeared to group unauthorized and exceeds
authorized access as one prong, as opposed to two separate forms of usage. United States
v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 460–61 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The type of usage displayed in Drew
however, seems to be predominantly considered to exceed authorized access by the
Circuit Courts championing the broad view. See discussion supra Section II.B. This type
of commonplace judicial inconsistency adds yet another stone to the pile in favor of lenity,
as well as evidence of the exceeds prong’s problematic placement in such a far-reaching
provision of the statute.
254 MySpace is a social networking site that allows users to build a profile by
uploading media in order to connect with others. See generally MYSPACE.COM, https://
myspace.com (last visited July 4, 2017).
255 Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 452.
256 Id.
257 Id.
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prosecution based its theory on the fact that the pertinent
MySpace terms of service covering access rights expressly
prohibited harassment of other members and the knowing use of
false information.258
The judge in Drew granted the defendant’s motion for
acquittal259 “primarily because of the absence of minimal
guidelines to govern law enforcement, but also because of
actual notice deficiencies.”260 While there was outrage at the
fact that the prosecution did not win the case, it is important to
consider the ramifications had the decision been in the
government’s favor. Most importantly, MySpace was entitled to
alter its terms of service at any time, therefore, if the court had
gone the other way, its holding could have effectively
criminalized anyone in violation of a website’s forever
malleable terms.261 To illustrate this point further, the decedent
in Drew—under the prosecution’s interpretation of the CFAA—
was a criminal herself, due to the fact she was a thirteen year
old using MySpace in clear contradiction of the minimum age
requirement of fourteen.262 Thus applying the prosecutor’s
interpretation of the CFAA, that a violation of a website’s
terms of service is enough to create criminal liability, nearly
anyone could be dragged into court.
Now, must one at least access the computer in question
themselves? In Auernheimer, another case illustrating how far
prosecutors may attempt to push Section (a)(2), the defendant
was charged even though he never personally accessed the
computer in question himself.263 David Spitler, a co-conspirator,
had discovered a security breach wherein he could manually
discover email addresses through an oversight in AT&T’s
attempt to streamline login services for iPad owners.264 In an
effort to publicize this lapse in AT&T security, Auernheimer
assisted Spitler in creating a program to automate the email
discovery process and subsequently shared the findings with
258 Id. at 454.
259 Id. at 468.
260 Id. at 464.
261 Id. at 454.
262 See id. (“By using the Services, you represent and warrant that (a) all
registration information you submit is truthful and accurate; (b) you will maintain the
accuracy of such information; (c) you are 14 years of age or older; and (d) your use of
the Services does not violate any applicable law or regulation.”).
263 United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525, 529–31 (3d Cir. 2014).
264 Id. At the relevant time, AT&T was the exclusive service provider for all
iPad owners. Id. at 529.
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the media.265 Luckily for the defendant, the conviction was
vacated due to the Third Circuit’s finding of improper venue.266
Yet had the court found Auernheimer guilty, how far
could the holding have been stretched? It would have raised the
issue as to how far removed one must be until they are exempt
from prosecution under the CFAA. While here Auernheimer’s
connection to the alleged violation was fairly close, could this
holding be extended to any software developer whose program
is used by a hacker?
Coming full circle, it is important to remember the
defendant in Teague, convicted for looking up President
Obama’s student loan records in a moment of idle curiosity.267
Here, the defendant’s conduct is a far cry from that in Valle,
which was undeniably cringe-inducing.268 No one was harmed,
in contrast to Drew where a minor committed suicide allegedly
due to the defendant’s violation of terms of service.269 Finally,
the defendant was no malicious opportunist, unlike the
defendants in the many employee/employer wrongful
misappropriation cases.270 Teague was a woman at work, who
typed a name into a database for no reason other than what
appeared to be curiosity.271 How far can this extremely strict
reasoning go? Under the broad interpretation, will any
miniscule infraction of a usage agreement be criminal? For
example, if an employer prohibited its employee from checking
personal emails at work, would the employee become a
criminal even if he were to accidently see one such email pop
up on his computer screen?
If the cases above are any indicator, then under the
broad view’s interpretation of the CFAA, nearly anyone could
be subjected to criminal or civil liability, or at the very least be
harassed with charges. Without a clearly defined path to
liability, the broad interpretation can be used to force people
into “making deals” or as an employer’s trump card against an
unruly employee. While obviously there must be penalties in
place to deter computer crime, under the current workings of the
broad interpretation, the ends simply do not justify the means—
265 Id. at 531; see also Ryan Tate, Apple’s Worst Security Breach: 114,000 iPad
Owners Exposed, GAWKER (June 9, 2010), http://gawker.com/5559346/apples-worst-
security-breach-114000-ipad-owners-exposed [https://perma.cc/2AGJ-XUFC].
266 Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 529.
267 See United States v. Teague, 646 F.3d 1119, 1121 (8th Cir. 2011).
268 See United States v. Valle, 807 F.3d 508, 512–13 (2d Cir. 2015).
269 United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 452 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
270 See discussion supra Section II.B.
271 See Teague, 646 F.3d at 1121.
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how many will blindly stumble into liability and face
incommensurate punishment in order to catch tomorrow’s Valle?
B. When the Distinction Disappears: Is the Exceeds Prong
Redundant Under the Narrow View?
At what point does the narrow interpretation of a use
that “exceeds authorized access” in fact become simply
“unauthorized”? When does a paper-thin distinction disappear
altogether, creating superfluous language that only serves to
muddy the waters? Under the narrow interpretation as made
mandatory by lenity, as well as some scholarly opinions and
proposed legislation, it could be argued that there is simply no
need for an exceeds prong—whether or not it is ultimately a
net positive.
Under the narrow interpretation of the exceeds prong,
there must be some further, internal circumvention as opposed
to a simple breach of trust. Yet wouldn’t any circumvention of a
barrier to which one is not authorized just become an
unauthorized access—whether done externally or internally? As
an example: would a student picking the lock to a professor’s
office be any more authorized than a burglar doing the same,
simply because the student is allowed in the building?
Professor Orin S. Kerr has proposed a code-based
approach, where a user must break through a code-based
barrier to become unauthorized, and rejects any analysis based
on a breach of contract—i.e., improper use.272 Professor Kerr
has also expressed that an exceeds prong based off of this
breach of contract approach would “create a remarkably broad
criminal prohibition that has no connection to the rationales of
criminal punishment,” and is better suited to be covered in
future legislation “focused directly at the problem of employee
database abuse.”273
After the death of Aaron Swartz, the bona fide computer
prodigy who killed himself due to facing decades in jail for
downloading academic articles after being charged under the
CFAA,274 there was proposed legislation, in part based on the
Fourth and Ninth Circuit opinions previously discussed.275
272 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and
“Authorization” in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003) (urging for
a code-based approach in interpreting the exceeds prong).
273 Id. at 1663.
274 For more information on Aaron Swartz, see supra Section V.A.
275 Wyden, Lofgren, Paul Introduce Bipartisan, Bicameral Aaron’s Law to
Reform Abused Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, RONWYDEN: SENATOR FOROR., (Apr. 21,
2015), https://www.wyden.senate.gov/news/press-releases/wyden-lofgren-paul-introduce-
1888 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:4
Namely, the proposed law (Aaron’s Law), would strike the
exceeds prong from the entirety of the CFAA, replacing both
the “unauthorized” and exceeds prongs with the language
“access without authorization,” meaning a circumvention of
“one or more technological or physical measures that are
designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized individuals from
obtaining that information.”276 Examples of such circumvention
include, but are not limited to “password requirements,
cryptography, or locked office doors.”277 Opponents of the law
urged that this will force companies to erect unnecessary barriers,
limit the sharing of information, as well as weaken a computer
crime statute when cybercrime is at an all-time high.278
Professor Kerr and the proposed legislation of Aaron’s
Law seem to realize that an exceeds prong would be
superfluous if circumvention was made a requirement for
violations. But, it overlooks the rising trend of computer crime
committed by insiders, who may not need to breach a single
barrier in order to satiate their nefarious purposes.279 By simply
removing the exceeds prong, or needing a circumvention—which
in this author’s opinion would simply be outside of the scope of
authorization—would render a huge hole within the CFAA. A
simpler solution, outside of a brand new law, or striking the
exceeds prong in its entirety, would be to remove the quasi-strict
liability from Section (a)(2), as enforced by the punishment
under Section (c)(2)(A), and create culpability only for Section
(a)(2) under (c)(2)(B)—a punishment with a clear culpable
conduct. Not only would the CFAA lose its potentially
astronomical reach, while still retaining the two decades of work
that went into the statute, but it could also remain a weapon
against insiders who make gross misuse of their authorization,
all without cracking a single code.
bipartisan-bicameral-aarons-law-to-reform-abused-computer-fraud-and-abuse-act-
[https://perma.cc/DDV9-RNYU].
276 Aaron’s Law Act of 2015, S. 1030, 114th Cong. § 2 (2015).
277 U.S. SENATE, SECTION-BY-SECTION SUMMARY OF AARON’S LAW 1–2, https://
www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=5E864E80-FC22-4665-9920-27007DF73201
&download=1 [https://perma.cc/3GN7-7D5Z].
278 Press Release, BSA, ‘Aaron’s Law’ Is Flawed, Says BSA (June 20, 2013),
http://www.bsa.org/news-and-events/news/2013/june/en06202013aaronslaw/?sc_lang=
en-US [https://perma.cc/RZG3-5D73].
279 See 4 Facts About Cybercrime (Cyber Security Statistics in 2016), EKRAN SYS.
BLOG (July 26, 2016), https://www.ekransystem.com/en/blog/cyber-security-statistics-2016
[https://perma.cc/2477-72G9].
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C. An Exceedingly Simple Solution
After examining the CFAA, its history, current form,
the circuit split in regard to the exceeds prong, and the
cannibal cop case that ushered the Second Circuit into this
linguistic dispute, the end point appears to be in sight. To fix
this dilemma of logic, one does not need a bulldozer, but a
scalpel. After an arduous journey through a decades-old statute
and a fifteen-year-old split, this author proposes a surgical
solution that not only aims to extinguish ambiguity and policy
concerns, but to do so without “declawing” the CFAA, or
creating a large loophole in the purview of its enforcement.
1. The Solution Defined
Put simply, the solution contends that to stabilize the
exceeds prong, Section (a)(2) should only become punishable
when behavior crosses the threshold into the second tier of
punishment under the CFAA’s sentencing system.280 Unlike the
first tier of punishment, which makes (a)(2) punishable for
access alone,281 the second tier requires the access be
“committed for purpose of commercial advantage or private
financial gain[,] . . . in furtherance of any criminal or tortious
act,” or “the value of the information obtained exceeds
$5,000.”282 By attaching specific malicious purposes as a
gateway to liability under (a)(2), it will allow for an improper
use analysis, while at the same time sufficiently reining in its
breadth. In essence, the change would eliminate any accidental
or harmless liability under (a)(2) when using an improper use
analysis, while still retaining the ability to punish fully
authorized bad actors—something the narrow view cannot do.283
Implementation of the change must be clear and
concise. First, (a)(2) must be removed from the first tier of
punishment, with the language then reading: “in the case of an
offense under subsection . . . (a)(3) or (a)(6).”284 It may also be
advantageous to clearly state that the subsection does not
apply to (a)(2) to avoid confusion, yet that also comes with the
caveat of adding unnecessary bulk to the section. Second, it
280 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B) (2012) (describing the second tier of punishment
under the CFAA).
281 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
282 Id. § 1030(c)(2)(B).
283 The fact that Valle would still be innocent under this proposed change is
not lost upon this author, yet what matters is had he been found guilty of conspiracy,
then he would have also been guilty of violating Section (a)(2).
284 See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
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must be made clear that a violation of (a)(2) requires the
malicious conduct contained under the second tier of
punishment. This can be done in two ways. The shortest
approach would be to reference (c)(2)(B) as a requirement of
(a)(2), alerting the reader to reference that punishment. The
alteration could read that “[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses
a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized
access,” in conjunction with the culpable conduct enumerated
in subsection (c)(2)(B), “and thereby obtains . . . information”
(followed by the rest of (a)(2)).285 This method comes with the
boon of brevity, yet makes the sacrifice of total clarity.
The other, more long-winded alternative would be to
repeat the language of (c)(2)(B) in (a)(2). It could read that
“[w]hoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access,” “committed for
purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain[,] . . . in furtherance of any criminal or tortious act in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of
any State; or . . . the value of the information obtained exceeds
$5,000,” “and thereby obtains . . . information” (with the
remaining text of the statute continuing as normal from there
on out).286 This approach is the clearer of the two, yet comes
with the cost of repetition. Both serve their purpose and put
the public on notice, yet the latter would be the more
advantageous considering the long-standing conflict and
confusion surrounding (a)(2) and the exceeds prong. Finally, no
other changes would need to be made to the other instances of
the exceeds prong. As (a)(1), (a)(4), and (a)(7) already have a
level of specificity attached to them (theft of government
secrets, fraud, and extortion, respectively).287 In fact, the
proposed alteration of (a)(2) would make it more similar to its
“sister sections.”
A final alteration, in addition to those mentioned above,
would be to alter the definition of “exceeds authorized access”
to officially include an improper use analysis. This may be
unnecessary, however, as it will be further argued that the
change detailed above would remove the need for lenity. Yet
due to the deeply entrenched positions of the circuits in conflict
with one another, a heavy handed approach may be the wiser
choice to help guide the courts. The change in the definition
would read that “the term ‘exceeds authorized access’ means to
285 See id. § 1030(a)(2).
286 Id. § 1030(a)(2), (c)(2)(B).
287 Id. § 1030(a)(1), (4), (7).
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access a computer with authorization and to use such access,”
either by circumvention or violation of usage restrictions, “to
obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser is
not entitled so to obtain or alter.”288 As these changes would
hopefully remove any ambiguity attached to the CFAA, it
would move the interpretation of “exceeds” closer to being free
of lenity’s mandate.
2. Eliminating Policy Concerns: Lenity No Longer
Needed
In its decision to apply lenity in Valle, the Second
Circuit gave substantial weight to the fact that their decision
would greatly shape precedent, “govern[ing] many other
situations.”289 The court knew that their “construction of the
statute [would] impact[ ] many more people than Valle.”290
Therefore, tantamount to the majority’s decision was the idea
that the broad view—“a highly problematic interpretation”—
could criminalize “checking Facebook at work,” and could
therefore not uphold the lower court’s decision, even if “the
Government promise[d] to use [the statute] responsibly.”291 To
put it bluntly, no governmental promise to abstain from
abusing such a far reaching interpretation of the CFAA could
assuage the court’s trepidation at the possibility of
criminalizing even the most miniscule deviations from any
computer use policy—including the usage restrictions imposed
by an employer against using social media at work.292
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Nosal was chagrin to
adopt the broad view as it would turn “the CFAA from an anti-
hacking statute into an expansive misappropriation statute,”
thereby creating “a sweeping Internet-policing mandate.”293 The
court also realized that their decision would affect the exceeds
prong as it appears throughout the CFAA in its entirety, as
“identical words and phrases within the same statute should
normally be given the same meaning.”294 Noting that Section
(a)(2)(C) lacks “any culpable intent,” and the term protected
288 Id. § 1030(e)(6).




293 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 857–58 (9th Cir. 2012).
294 Id. at 859 (quoting Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S.
224, 232 (2007)). This is similar to the Fourth Circuit’s discussion of lenity in Miller,
applying the doctrine even though it was a civil case, as the CFAA involves “both civil
and criminal application” and their reasoning would therefore “appl[y] uniformly in
both contexts.” WEC Energy Sols. LLC v. Miller, 687 F.3d 199, 203–04 (4th Cir. 2012).
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computer includes “effectively all computers with Internet
access,” the court did not want to turn “millions of unsuspecting
individuals” into criminals for violating “vague and generally
unknown” terms of service, or by “g-chatting with friends, playing
games, shopping or watching sports highlights” at work.295
If the solution detailed above were to take effect, the
policy concerns of the Second and Ninth Circuits would
effectively evaporate. With a clearly defined road to criminality,
the elimination of strict liability, and an overall higher bar of
culpability, the statute would no longer loom over the heads of
any individual using a computer. At the same time, by
removing these policy concerns and removing the need for
lenity, the CFAA could still be used as a tool to punish internal
offenders who otherwise have full authorization.
As a final illustration of how this solution could serve to
make both sides happy, recall the examples of Steve
Strawman, employee of Hypothetical Inc. In the first example
given, where Steve used his authorization to obtain a client list
to sell to a competitor, he would not have been guilty under the
narrow view.296 Yet under this new approach, as this action was
done for private financial gain and possibly fraud, then his
improper use would have triggered liability under Section (a)(2)
as well, thus preventing Steve from shirking culpability.
Conversely, in the second example, where Steve would have
been guilty under the broad view merely by accessing the client
information to send out invitations to his dinner party,297 he
would not have under this proposed solution, as his conduct did
not cross the requisite threshold into criminality. While not
perfect, the proposed solution at least better equips the CFAA
to filter out the good from the bad.
CONCLUSION
Computers, cannibals, ambiguity, and a grammatical
grudge match have found both the narrow view acute, and the
broad view obtuse. Yet only through this clashing of polarized
interpretations does a median appear. By harvesting wisdom
from both sides of the argument, a clearly enumerated improper
use analysis could serve to arm the CFAA with a properly
restrained, yet necessarily flexible application. But while 20/20
hindsight is an advantage to someone when playing the role of
295 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 859–62.
296 See discussion supra Part II & Section II.A.
297 See discussion supra Part II & Section II.B.
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“armchair congressman,” we must not lose sight of the
challenges faced in the drafting of laws. As shown in this note,
three simple words can cause untold conflict, proving that even
Murphy was an optimist.298 As laws creak and struggle with
innovation, policy, and change—like the bow of a ship
navigating through uncharted water—one must realize that
although these laws can be fallible, they are more than simple
words on a page. They represent an evolving doctrine, that at
its best represents the amalgamated values of an entire nation,
and at its worst . . . well, there’s always lenity.
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298 “[T]he facetious proposition that if anything can go wrong, it will.” Murphy’s
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